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REASONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS 
PG du Toit 
GM Ferreira 
1 Introduction 
The Constitution empowers the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to institute 
criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out any necessary functions 
incidental to instituting criminal proceedings.1 The NPA is an institution integral to the 
rule of law and it is important that it acts in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
prescripts and within its powers.2 The decision to prosecute or decline prosecution is 
a serious step that may affect accused persons and their families, victims, witnesses 
and the public at large and must be undertaken with the utmost care.3 A recent 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal,4 for instance, held that the failure of the 
prosecution to exercise sensible discretion and decline to prosecute had led a matter 
without any merit to be pursued to that court. The expenditure of time and effort, and 
the costs to the public purse and the appellants had been considerable. These included 
emotional costs and the convictions that hung over their heads. This contribution aims 
to address the nature of the duty resting on South African prosecutors to provide 
reasons for the decision to prosecute or decisions to decline or discontinue a 
prosecution. 
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1  Section 179(2) Constitution of the Republic South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the 
Constitution). 
2  Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 3 SA 486 (SCA) para 
45. 
3  See for instance NPA 2014 http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent504.aspx 5 (hereafter Prosecution 
Policy) and Crown Prosecution Service, England and Wales Code for Crown Prosecutors 3 para 2.1. 
4  S v Macrae 2014 2 SACR 15 (SCA) paras 1, 30. 
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2 Prosecuting policy on the discretion to prosecute and reasons 
In accordance with constitutional requirements5 the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP) issued a prosecution policy6 and policy directives7 which must be 
observed in the prosecution process. The prosecution policy requires from prosecutors 
when deciding whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against an accused to 
assess whether there is sufficient and admissible evidence to provide a reasonable 
prospect of a successful prosecution. There must indeed be a reasonable prospect of 
a conviction, otherwise the prosecution should not be commenced with or continued.8 
When evaluating the evidence, prosecutors should take into account all relevant 
factors, including the strength of the case for the state; the admissibility of the 
evidence; the credibility of state witnesses; the reliability of the evidence; the 
availability of the evidence and the strength of the defence case.9 Once the prosecutor 
is satisfied there is sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a conviction, 
a prosecution should normally follow unless public interest demands otherwise. When 
considering whether or not it will be in the public interest to prosecute, the prosecutor 
should consider factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the interests 
of the victim and the broader community, and the circumstances of the offender.10 
From the preceding exposition it should be clear that the decision to prosecute rests 
solely with the prosecutor. His or her discretion is, however, not unfettered in the 
sense that the jurisdictional facts to be taken into account are left to him or her to 
determine. The common law prescribes the specific factors to be considered so as to 
ensure an informed decision. Under the previous constitutional dispensation 
                                        
5  Sections 179(5)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
6  Prosecution Policy 5. 
7  NPA Policy Directives (hereafter Policy Directives). According to the NPA this document is 
confidential and, unlike the Prosecution Policy not a public document. In S v Shaik 2008 2 SA 208 
(CC) para 33 it was held that the Policy Manual of the NPA (which at the time contained the 
Prosecution Policy and the NDPP's Policy Directives) is a public document. The document was 
nevertheless found on the internet at NPA 2014 http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/ 
Prosecution%20Policy%20Directives%20with%20effect%20from%201%20June%202014.pdf. It 
seems that the link has since been removed. 
8  Prosecution Policy 5. This is in line with common law requirements. A prosecution will be wrongful 
if reasonable and probable grounds for the prosecution are absent (National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 37). 
9  Prosecution Policy 6. For a general discussion of the issue of prosecutorial discretion, see Du Toit 
et al 2014 Commentary 1-36 – 1-39. 
10  Prosecution Policy 7. 
PG DU TOIT & GM FERREIRA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1509 
characterised by parliamentary sovereignty, unfettered discretions were often granted 
statutorily to officials. The most notorious of these probably was section 29 of the 
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982, in terms of which a police official could decide to 
arrest and detain any person without trial if he or she had reason to believe that such 
a person endangered the safety of the state. The said section also excluded the 
jurisdiction of the courts to test the validity of the police official's decision. The legal 
position concerning the exercise of discretion has changed dramatically in the current 
constitutional dispensation. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs11 the Constitutional 
Court explicitly stated that guidance must be given with regard to the exercise of 
broad discretions in order to promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights. Hoexter therefore correctly states that "the idea of uncontrolled or unguided 
discretion is hopelessly at odds with modern constitutionalism".12 This is fully in line 
with section 195(1)(g) of the Constitution, which requires the public administration to 
be transparent. Part of being transparent is the furnishing of reasons for decisions, 
and one can expect that the reasons thus supplied will relate to the prescribed factors 
that were taken into account when the decision was made. 
In terms of the NDPP's Policy Directives, prosecutors should record in the docket the 
reason(s) for declining to prosecute a matter. Prosecutors should entertain requests 
for reasons for the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion emanating only from 
persons with a legitimate interest in the matter.13 The question arises as to what would 
constitute a legitimate interest. The answer to this question would depend heavily on 
the circumstances of each case, but it can be declared with certainty that it would in 
many instances involve more persons than only the complainant and the accused. In 
this regard it must be emphasised, as has been noted above, that the public interest 
plays a central role in any decision to prosecute or not. In a constitutional state such 
as South Africa, prosecutorial decisions have a direct bearing on the fundamental 
rights of individuals, insofar as crime very often similtaneously involves a violation of 
one or more of a victim's fundamental rights. In addition, the state has a constitutional 
                                        
11  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 54. 
12  Hoexter Administrative Law 47. 
13  Policy Directives 19.  
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duty to protect the public against crime.14 The Constitution takes a broad view with 
regard to the necessary locus standi to enforce the rights in the Bill of Rights and 
explicitly provides inter alia in section 38 that anyone acting in the public interest has 
the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has 
been infringed or threatened. Against this background it would seem fair to state that 
the public has a particular interest in prosecutorial decisions. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal has in fact found that a political party15 and a public interest organisation 
involved in the promotion of democracy and the advancement of respect for the rule 
of law16 have the necessary locus standi to challenge decisions of the NDPP in matters 
of considerable public interest and national importance. 
The right to just administrative action in section 33 of the Constitution embodies the 
right to be furnished with reasons for administrative action. Section 1 of the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA), however, excludes a decision 
to prosecute from the definition of administrative action.17 This does not imply that 
decisions to prosecute or not should not be accompanied by reasons for the particular 
decision. In fact, the exclusion of prosecutorial decisions from the definition of 
administrative action in the PAJA is for the purposes of the PAJA only, and should not 
be elevated to a general rule that because a prosecutorial decision cannot be equated 
with an administrative decision, the reasons for prosecutorial decisions could never be 
important. 
In view of the preceding exposition it is suggested that to recognise the interest of 
the public in obtaining reasons for prosecutorial decisions would be fully in line with 
the spirit and purport of the Constitution. It has long been settled in common law that 
a negative inference may be drawn from a refusal to furnish reasons for administrative 
decisions, even when there is no legal duty upon the decision-making functionary to 
                                        
14  See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 44. 
15  Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 3 SA 486 (SCA) paras 
38-47. 
16  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 2 SACR 107 (SCA) para 18. 
17  See para 4 hereunder for a detailed discussion of the legal position pertaining to the review of 
prosecutorial decisions.  
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do so. The court in WC Greyling and Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local Road 
Transportation Board18 explained the position as follows: 
It has repeatedly been held that a body like the Commission is not obliged to give 
reasons for its decision. But that does not mean that it should not furnish reasons for 
its decision. By not giving reasons it may run the risk of an adverse inference being 
drawn... . Whether or not to give reasons is a matter which it must make out for itself 
in the circumstances of each particular case. Where, as here, the only evidence 
presented is impressive and acceptable, remains unchallenged in cross-examination 
and uncontradicted by other evidence, then the failure to give reasons tend to 
support an inference that the evidence was ignored. 
Although it is granted that a commission as in WC Greyling could not legally be equated 
with a prosecutor, and although the PAJA explicitly excludes prosecutorial decisions 
(for the purposes of the Act) from the definition of administrative action, it is strongly 
suggested that the principle as enunciated in WC Greyling remains relevant and 
applicable, especially when taken into account that the prosecuting authority is part 
and parcel of the executive. In a constitutional democracy like South Africa, strong 
and effective control over the executive is imperative. The furnishing of reasons 
constitutes an important element in such control. The right to having access to reasons 
(whether for administrative action in terms of section 33(2) of the Constitution as 
confirmed in section 5 of the PAJA or for prosecutorial decisions) should not be 
confused with the right of access to information (in terms of section 32 of the 
Constitution). Pertaining to the right of access to information, section 32 establishes 
the right of an individual to have access to "any information held by the state" as well 
as "all information that is held by another person and that is required for the protection 
of any rights". It is interesting to note that no constitutional limitation is placed on the 
right of individuals to request information held by the state. This is in stark contrast 
to the right of individuals to request information held by other individuals insofar as 
the said information may be requested only if it is needed for the protection of any 
rights of the requesting party. The fact that the Constitution itself does not limit the 
individual's right of access to information held by the state is undoubtedly a strong 
confirmation of the interest of the general public's right to know. 
                                        
18  WC Greyling and Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1982 4 SA 
427 (A) 448C-D. 
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The scope of the concept of information is normally much broader than that of 
reasons. It might or might not include reasons for a decision, depending on at what 
stage of the decision-making process the request for information is submitted. If the 
request is submitted before the final decision has been taken it would understandably 
not include reasons, but if it submitted after the final decision has been taken it might 
also include the reasons for the particular decision. The right of access to information 
must be balanced against the right to privacy protected in section 14 of the 
Constitution. In this regard the recently adopted Protection of Personal Information 
Act 4 of 2013 is relevant. In terms of section 2 the purpose of the Act is, broadly 
speaking, to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by safeguarding personal 
information while at the same time protecting the free flow of information within South 
Africa and across international borders. The Act contains a number of exclusions and 
determines inter alia in section 6(1)(c)(ii) that: 
[t]his Act does not apply to the processing of personal information ... by or on behalf 
of a public body ... the purpose of which is the prevention, detection, including 
assistance in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities and the 
combating of money laundering activities, investigation or proof of offences, the 
prosecution of offenders or the execution of sentences or security measures, to the 
extent that adequate safeguards have been established in legislation for the 
protection of such personal information. 
It is suggested that the exclusion as formulated in section 6 is broad enough to also 
cover prosecutorial decisions. 
When requesting information from the prosecuting authority, the provisions of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) must be taken into account. 
Section 39 inter alia provides that a request for information may be refused if the 
requested information deals with the methods, techniques, procedures or guidelines 
for the prosecution of alleged offenders, and the disclosure of the information could 
reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of the said methods, 
techniques, procedures or guidelines, or lead to the circumvention of the law, or 
facilitate the commission of an offence. A request for information could furthermore 
be refused in terms of section 39 if the prosecution of an alleged offender is being 
prepared or about to commence or pending and the disclosure of the information 
could reasonably be expected to impede the said prosecution or result in a miscarriage 
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of justice in that prosecution. In addition, section 39 determines that the requested 
information could be refused if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to 
prejudice the investigation of a contravention of the law, reveal the identity of a 
confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of 
the law, result in the intimidation or coercion of a witness in criminal or other 
proceedings to enforce the law, facilitate the commission of a contravention of the 
law, or prejudice or impair the fairness of a trial or the impartiality of an adjudication. 
Although the Act grants a discretion to refuse to provide the requested information, it 
is not a free and unfettered discretion. The Act explicitly requires the decision to refuse 
to provide the requested information to be reasonable. What would constitute a 
reasonable decision under the particular circumstances of a specific case is in the final 
analysis left to the courts to decide. In this regard it is strongly suggested that the 
grounds for refusal cited by the Act could and should not be interpreted to include a 
refusal to provide reasons for a decision to prosecute or not. The distinction between 
reasons and information should be maintained and the latter should not be understood 
to automatically include reasons for prosecutorial decisions as well.19 
The Policy Directives of the NPA states that in the interest of transparency and 
accountability, and in accordance with section 33(3) of the Constitution, reasons 
should as a rule be given upon request. The nature and detail of the reasons given 
will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In general the ratio, rather than 
specific detail, should be given. Prosecutors should be careful not to infringe the rights 
of anyone by providing such reasons. Typical reasons for a decision not to prosecute 
may include that the state would not be able to prove that the accused had the 
necessary intention to commit the offence in question; that the state would not be 
able to disprove the defence of the accused; and that the complainant is a single 
witness, whereas there are several defence witnesses to corroborate the version of 
the accused person. It also provides that reasons as to why a prosecution is to be 
                                        
19  The right to access to the police docket was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in Shabalala v 
Attorney-General, Transvaal; Gumede v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 2 SACR 761 (CC). 
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proceeded with and particular charges formulated must be handled with care in order 
not to cause embarrassment or unnecessary debate.20 
The National Prosecuting Authority Act provides for a Code of Conduct to be framed 
by the National Director of Public Prosecutions, which should be complied with by all 
members of the Prosecuting Authority.21 In terms of the code, prosecutors should, if 
requested by interested parties, supply reasons for the exercise of a prosecutorial 
discretion, unless the individual rights of persons such as victims, witnesses or accused 
persons might be prejudiced, or where it might not be in the public interest to do so.22 
3 Transparency and public confidence 
Dr Percy Yutar once declared that an attorney-general23 is not obliged to give reasons 
for any decision he may take "either to academics, whether they are professors of law 
or not, or to newspapers which may have misgivings about his decision".24 Fortunately 
this approach has given way to a more transparent one whereby the prosecution 
service does provide reasons for decisions, albeit not necessarily in great detail. 
Hoexter25 has identified procedural and substantive benefits for the giving of reasons. 
An individual whose rights have been affected is in a better position to make the 
decision to challenge or not to challenge, once reasons for the decision are available. 
The duty to give reasons can also improve the quality of the decision and the public 
administration. An official who knows that he or she must give reasons will take 
greater care not to take an arbitrary or unreasonable decision.26 
                                        
20  Policy Directives 19.  
21  Section 22(6)(a) National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the NPA 
Act). 
22  GN R1257 in GG 33907 of 29 December 2010 (Code of Conduct for Members of the National 
Prosecuting Authority) Part D para 2(d). 
23  Now known as a Director of Public Prosecutions. 
24  Yutar 1977 SACC 143. Also see the English case of Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers 1978 
AC 435 at 487, where it was stated that "The Attorney-General has many powers and duties. He 
may stop any prosecution on indictment by entering a nolle prosequi. He merely has to sign a 
piece of paper saying that he does not wish the prosecution to continue. He need not give any 
reasons." 
25  Hoexter Administrative Law 463. 
26  Hoexter Administrative 464. Also see Medwed 2010 Cardozo L Rev 2206. 
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A number of role players may have an interest in the criminal justice system. The 
decision to prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution is a serious step that affects law 
enforcement agencies, suspects, victims, witnesses and the public at large, and must 
be undertaken with the utmost care.27 The providing of reasons to explain a decision 
not to prosecute may be of vital importance to maintaining confidence in the 
administration of criminal justice. The victim of crime may also feel aggrieved by 
decisions not to prosecute, or decisions to prosecute when the victim is not in favour 
of a prosecution. In terms of the Service Charter of Victims of Crime in South Africa, 
victims may request reasons for a decision that has been taken in their case whether 
or not to prosecute.28 
Interested parties may also question the nature of the charge brought against the 
accused. The Canadian directives regarding the conduct of prosecutions29 underscore 
the importance of the providing of reasons to achieve confidence in the administration 
of justice. The Directives provide that reasons should be provided to the police or the 
investigative agency in serious matters or those of significant public interest when a 
decision not to prosecute has been made. The reasons must reflect sensitivity to the 
police or the investigative agency's mandate. The need to maintain confidence in the 
administration of justice may also necessitate, in certain circumstances, public 
communication of the reasons for not prosecuting. The communication may occur by 
way of a statement in court at the time charges are withdrawn, or a media release. 
In providing reasons, the privacy interests of the victims, witnesses and the accused 
persons should be considered.30 In Canada the prosecution is not legally required to 
give reasons for its core decision-making in terms of the prosecution directives. 
However, it may be advisable in certain circumstances to offer an explanation for 
decisions taken in order to help maintain public confidence in the administration of 
                                        
27  See, for instance, Crown Prosecution Service, England and Wales Code for Crown Prosecutors. 
This Code was issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales under s 10 of 
the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985. Also see Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook 
para 3.5. These directives were issued by the Canadian Attorney General in terms of s 10(2) 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1983. 
28  DOJ&CD Date Unknown http://www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/vc-eng.pdf para 3. 
29  See fn 5. 
30  Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook para 3.5. 
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justice. The Directives also make reference to the judgment R v Gill,31 where it was 
stated that by offering an explanation the prosecutor clearly enhances the 
transparency of his or her decision-making process and, hence, the fairness of the 
proceedings. The Directives require Crown counsel to provide an explanation for a 
particular decision when it is in the public interest to do so, for example where the 
basis of the decision is not self-evident and it is reasonably foreseeable that the lack 
of an explanation would lead the court or members of the public to draw conclusions 
that attribute erroneous and improper motives to the Crown's exercise of prosecutorial 
discretions.32 
Closely related to the issue of accountability and transparency is the argument that a 
policy of giving reasons for decisions would enhance the fairness and efficiency with 
which prosecutorial decisions are made, in that prosecutors may be more anxious to 
ensure that decisions are seen to be fair if a greater range of people are granted 
access to the reasons for the decision. If a prosecutor knows that the reasons for the 
decision will be made known to the injured party, he or she will be particularly careful 
to set out the reasons clearly and logically in a manner which can be defended.33 
There are also other factors that may necessitate the furnishing of reasons by the 
prosecution authority in South Africa. The Minister of Justice has the final responsibility 
over the prosecuting authority. At the request of the Minister the NDPP must provide 
the Minister with reasons for any decision taken by a DPP in the exercise of his or her 
duties or the performance of his or her functions.34 This, however, does not grant the 
Minister the authority to interfere with decisions to prosecute or not. The Minister is 
nevertheless entitled to be kept informed where public interest or an important aspect 
of legal or prosecutorial authority is involved.35 Prosecutors may also be required by 
DPPs to provide reasons for decisions not to prosecute, for example in cases where 
the DPP has received complaints or representations from members of the public.36 It 
                                        
31  R v Gill 2012 ONCA 607 para 75. 
32  Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook para 3.5. 
33  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 35. 
34  Section 33(2) NPA Act. 
35  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 33. 
36  Du Toit et al Commentary 1-27 - 1-28, regarding the ways in which a DPP can direct and control 
decisions of public prosecutors. 
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is submitted that this internal review mechanism provides an important safeguard for 
sound prosecutorial decisions. 
4 Possible problems with detailed reasons 
In 2008 the Director of Public Prosecutions of Ireland published a discussion paper in 
reconsideration of the policy at the time of not giving reasons for decisions.37 One of 
the reasons for reconsidering the policy was a case decided in 2003 by the European 
Court on Human Rights, which appears to be authority for the proposition that reasons 
are to be given for decisions not to prosecute to the relatives of a deceased person 
killed by the use of lethal force by agents of the state.38 The paper pointed to a number 
of unintended, negative outcomes that could possibly flow from giving reasons for 
prosecutorial decisions. Giving specific rather than broad, general reasons has the 
potential in some cases to cast doubt on the innocence of persons who are merely 
suspected of committing a crime.39 One of the main arguments against the provision 
of reasons for not prosecuting in any form is that to do so could cast doubt on the 
innocence of a suspect without the individual's having the benefit of the protections 
afforded by the trial process. This could arise even in cases in which a suspect is not 
named but is readily identifiable given the circumstances of the case. A suspect could 
be prejudiced even if the people who were in a position to draw an inference as to the 
identity of the likely suspect were relatively few in number. There are two possible 
legal arguments against the release of such a statement on this basis alone: the 
protection of a person's good name and the presumption of innocence. 
To give a specific reason, as opposed to a "bland generality" (such as, for example, 
that the evidence did not permit a prosecution), could in many cases cast doubt on 
the innocence of a person and thereby violate the presumption of innocence that can 
be confirmed or rebutted only by a trial in open court where an accused is equally 
represented.40 This fact is well illustrated by the ill-advised media statement of a 
                                        
37  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper. 
38  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 14-16. The case is reported as Jordan v 
United Kingdom 2003 37 EHRR 52. 
39  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 7, 29. 
40  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 7, 13. 
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former National Director of Public Prosecutions regarding the decision not to prosecute 
the then Deputy President of South Africa. In the course of 2003 the NDPP issued a 
press statement stating that although there was a prima facie case of corruption 
against the then Deputy President, he would not be prosecuted, as the prospects of 
success were "not strong enough". This announcement sparked off a media frenzy 
and a public debate regarding the Deputy President's alleged or suspected 
involvement in corrupt relationships and improper conduct.41 The Public Protector 
found that the press statement made by the NDPP unjustifiably infringed upon the 
Deputy President's constitutional right to human dignity and caused him to be 
improperly prejudiced. The Public Protector found the press statement to be unfair 
and improper. Giving reasons in some cases could violate the presumption of 
innocence, which is a cornerstone of our legal system, and could create significant 
injustice. There needs to be careful consideration of the balance between the interest 
in disclosure to the injured party and perhaps also the wider public, and the need to 
protect reputation and the presumption of innocence. There is also a need to carefully 
balance other societal interests. For example, it is important to avoid prejudice to other 
proceedings.42 
Giving reasons could erode the standing or reputation of a witness, including the 
complainant. For example, to say a witness was not thought to be reliable would have 
the potential for serious psychological consequences as well as attacking the 
witnesses' right to his or her good name, particularly if the implication was that the 
witness was not merely incorrect but telling a deliberate untruth. The tension between 
"competing interests" also arises when balancing the requirements of transparency 
and accountability in the prosecutorial process with the needs of national security and 
the duty on the State to vindicate and protect the life and person of every citizen. This 
could, for example, be compromised by revealing the identity or perhaps even the 
existence of a police informant.43 The State must also be careful not to reveal 
privileged information, such as the names of informants. 
                                        
41  Public Protector Special Report (hereafter referred to as Special Report). 
42  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 7. 
43  Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 8. These problems are discussed in more 
detail at 29-33. The discussion paper also referred to a number of practical problems such as the 
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5 Reasons for purposes of review proceedings 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) provides for the judicial 
review of administrative action.44 The Act excludes "a decision to institute or continue 
a prosecution" from the definition of "administrative action".45 In National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law46 (hereafter referred to as Freedom Under 
Law) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that decisions to prosecute and not to 
prosecute are of the same genus and that, although on the purely textual 
interpretation the exclusion in PAJA is limited to the former, it must be understood to 
incorporate the latter as well.47 The duty to give reasons when rights or interests are 
affected is an "indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review". Unless the 
person affected can discover the reason behind the decision, he or she may be unable 
to tell whether it is reviewable or not, and so may be deprived of the protection of the 
law.48 It has been held that where facts gave rise to a prima facie inference that the 
decision was irrational, the failure to give reasons may lead to confirmation of that 
prima facie inference.49 The court then referred to the judgment of Harms DP in 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma,50 where a number of English cases 
were cited that emphasised the same policy considerations that underlie the exclusion 
of decisions to prosecute from the PAJA definition of administrative action. The court 
held that the first principle established by those cases is that in England decisions to 
prosecute are not immune from judicial review, but the court's power to do so is 
sparingly exercised. The policy considerations for courts' limiting their own power to 
interfere in this manner are twofold. Firstly, the independence of the prosecuting 
authority must be save-guarded by limiting the extent to which a review of its decisions 
can be brought before a court and, secondly, the wide extent of the discretion (which 
is not totally unfettered) exercised by the prosecuting authority and the polycentric 
                                        
risk of increased delay in the criminal process, the need for additional resources and the need for 
training. 
44  Section 6 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter referred to as PAJA). 
45  Section 1(ff) PAJA. 
46  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 2 SACR 107 (SCA). 
47  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 2 SACR 107 (SCA) para 27. 
48  Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 159. 
49  Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) para 51. Also see Hoexter 
Administrative Law 466-467. 
50  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 35 fn 31. 
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character that generally accompanies its decision-making includes considerations of 
public interest and policy.51 The court held that the underlying considerations of policy 
can be no different with regard to decisions not to prosecute or to discontinue a 
prosecution. Brand JA concluded that although decisions to prosecute are - in the 
same way as decisions not to prosecute - subject to judicial review, judicial review 
does not extend to the wider basis of PAJA, but is limited to grounds of legality and 
rationality.52 The court then turned its attention to the principle of legality and held 
that this principle is well established in the law as an alternative pathway to judicial 
review where PAJA does not find application.53 Harms JA pointed out that the principle 
acts as a safety net to give the court some degree of control over action that does not 
qualify as administrative action under PAJA, but none the less involves the exercise of 
public power. The court held that it can be accepted with confidence that it includes 
review on grounds of rationality and on the basis that the decision-maker did not act 
in accordance with the empowering statute.54 In R v DPP, ex parte C55 the Queen's 
Bench after reviewing a number of decisions concluded that a decision not to 
prosecute may be reviewed because of some unlawful policy; or because the Director 
of Public Prosecutions failed to act in accordance with the policy set out in the 
prosecution code, or because the decision was perverse - it was a decision at which 
no reasonable prosecutor could have arrived.56 The Constitutional Court has described 
the nature of the rationality principle as follows: 
It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive 
and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related 
to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary 
and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass constitutional 
scrutiny the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries must, 
at least, comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the standards 
demanded by our Constitution for such action. The question whether a decision is 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given calls for an objective 
enquiry. Otherwise a decision that, viewed objectively, is in fact irrational, might pass 
muster simply because the person who took it mistakenly and in good faith believed 
                                        
51  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 25. 
52  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 27. 
53  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 28. 
54  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 29. 
55  R v DPP, ex parte C 1995 1 Cr App R. 
56  Du Toit et al Commentary 1-22 - 1-26 for a detailed discussion on the powers of the court to 
interfere in prosecutions. 
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it to be rational. Such a conclusion would place form above substance and undermine 
an important constitutional principle.57 
Since decisions to prosecute and decisions not to prosecute are excluded from review 
in terms of PAJA the question arises whether prosecutors are in any event obliged to 
give reasons. It is submitted that the obligation to give reasons, if called upon to do 
so, are implied by the constitutional duty of the NPA to exercise its powers in a way 
that is not irrational or arbitrary; and by the fact that the NPA is bound to the 
constitutional values of transparency and accountability.58 As Brand JA once pointed 
out: "[i]t is difficult to think of a way to account for one's decisions other than to give 
reasons".59 Reasons must be informative and adequate.60 It is submitted that in the 
case of the prosecuting authority, general reasons instead of detailed reasons may, in 
view of the dangers attached to the dissemination of detailed reasons, be adequate. 
Whether or not reasons are adequate will, however, depend on the factual matrix of 
each case. It should, however, be noted that a prosecution is not wrongful merely 
because it is brought for an improper purpose. It will be wrongful only if reasonable 
and probable grounds for the prosecution are also absent.61 In Booysen v Acting 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Minister of Police62 Gorven J held that the 
level of disclosure of the NDPP for offences (in that case offences in terms of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998) cannot be such as to prejudice the 
state in its conduct of a future trial. It will therefore not require an exacting or 
exhaustive level of disclosure. The court found that it is certainly not necessary to 
disclose every detail of the state's case, strategy or evidence which is not subject to 
the criminal discovery process. The court refrained, however, from making a positive 
finding as to the level of disclosure necessary in meeting an application for review, 
and stated that it can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
                                        
57  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re ex parte President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 
674 (CC) paras 85, 86. 
58  Mphalele v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1999 2 SA 667 (CC) para 12; Judicial Service Commission 
v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) para 51. Also see Hoexter Administrative Law 463, 470-
472. 
59  Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) para 51. 
60  Hoexter Administrative Law 461, 476-481. 
61  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 37. 
62  Booysen v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 2 SACR 556 (KZD) para 38. 




It is important that decisions of prosecutors be consistent and reliable. The approach 
of the South African prosecuting authority is that reasons should generally be given 
on request and that, in general the ratio, rather than specific detail, should be given. 
Reasons for the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion should also follow upon requests 
only from persons with a legitimate interest in the matter. This approach is based on 
sound reasons of policy. It is clearly in the interests of transparency and accountability 
that reasons for decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute be given to interested 
parties. These include victims and their families, law enforcement agencies and 
witnesses. Prosecutors should, however, also be careful not to infringe the rights of 
anyone when providing such reasons. The nature and extent of the reasons will 
therefore depend on the circumstances of each case. The category of persons with a 
legitimate interest may, however, be broader than merely those with a direct link to 
the criminal case. Transparent public prosecutions are essential for maintaining the 
rule of law. Our courts have acknowledged the locus standi of public interest 
organisations and political parties to challenge decisions of the prosecuting authority. 
Prosecutorial decisions may be reviewed at the very least on grounds of the 
irrationality of the decision and non-compliance with an empowering provision. Thus 
far the exact measure of disclosure for the purposes of review proceedings is not clear. 
If the objective facts point to an irrational decision, the failure to provide adequate 
reasons may lead to the inference that the prosecutorial decision was indeed irrational. 
  





Crown Prosecution Service, England and Wales Code for Crown Prosecutors 
Crown Prosecution Service, England and Wales The Code for Crown Prosecutors 
(Crown Prosecution Service London 2013) 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland Discussion Paper on 
Prosecution Policy on the Giving of Reasons for Decisions (Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions Dublin 2008) 
Du Toit et al Commentary 
Du Toit E et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 
2014 update) 
Hoexter Administrative Law 
Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2012) 
Medwed 2010 Cardozo L Rev 
Medwed DS "Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the 
Innocence of Evolution" 2010 Cardozo L Rev 2187-2213 
NPA Policy Directives 
National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Directives Issued by the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NPA Pretoria 2014) (unpublished 
document) 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Public Prosecution Service 
Ottawa 2014) 
Public Protector Special Report 
Public Protector Report on an Investigation by the Public Protector of a 
Complaint by Deputy President J Zuma against the National Director of Public 
PG DU TOIT & GM FERREIRA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1524 
Prosecutions and the National Prosecuting Authority in Connection with a 
Criminal Investigation Conducted against Him - Report No 26 (Special Report) 
(Public Protector Pretoria 2004) 
Yutar 1977 SACC 
Yutar P "The Office of the Attorney General" 1977 SACC   
Case law 
Canada 
R v Gill 2012 ONCA 607 
England 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers 1978 AC 435 
R v DPP, ex parte C 1995 1 Cr App R 
European Court of Human Rights 
Jordan v United Kingdom 2003 37 EHRR 52 
South Africa 
Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) 
Booysen v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 2 SACR 556 (KZD) 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 
Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 3 SA 486 
(SCA) 
Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) 
Mphalele v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1999 2 SA 667 (CC) 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 2 SACR 107 (SCA) 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re ex parte President of the RSA 
2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 
S v Macrae 2014 2 SACR 15 (SCA) 
S v Shaik 2008 2 SA 208 (CC) 
PG DU TOIT & GM FERREIRA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1525 
Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal; Gumede v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 
2 SACR 761 (CC) 
WC Greyling and Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 
1982 4 SA 427 (A) 
Legislation 
Canada 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1983 
England and Wales 
Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985 
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 
Government publications 
GN R1257 in GG 33907 of 29 December 2010 (Code of Conduct for Members of the 
National Prosecuting Authority) 
Internet sources 
DOJ&CD Date Unknown http://www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/vc-eng.pdf 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Date Unknown Service 
Charter of Victims of Crime in South Africa http://www.justice.gov.za 
/VC/docs/vc/vc-eng.pdf accesed 8 September 2014 
  
PG DU TOIT & GM FERREIRA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1526 
NPA 2014 http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent504.aspx 
National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa 2014 Prosecution Policy 
http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent504.aspx accessed 29 January 2015 
NPA 2014 http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/Prosecution%20Policy%20Directives 
%20with%20effect%20from%201%20June%202014.pdf 
National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa 2014 Policy Manual 
http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/Prosecution%20Policy%20Directives%
20with%20effect%20from%201%20June%202014.pdf accessed 29 January 
2015 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Cardozo L Rev Cardozo Law Review 
DOJ&CD Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions 
NDPP National Director of Public Prosecutions 
NPA National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa 
PAIA Promotion of Access to Information Act 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
SACC South African Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
 
